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Production Control and Production Contracts:
Why Do Integrators Control Inputs?
Abstract: In broiler and hog production contracts the integrator provides or
specifies major non-labor inputs.  Previous work attributed this pattern to quality
considerations, which does not explain widespread concern  among producers regarding
loss of management control.  I demonstrate that integrators reduce payments to producers
by controlling inputs, regardless of quality considerations.1
 Contracting has long accounted for the vast majority of broilers produced and is
the norm for many processed vegetables. Recently, contracting has expanded its share of
output in other products, particularly pork. Barkema & Cook (1993) indicate that 10 to
15% of the nation’s hogs were produced under contract in 1990, double the share under
contract in 1980. The increasing importance of production contracts and the
accompanying potential for thinning spot markets has focused public concern on the
effects of contracting.  The Economic Research Service (ERS) of the USDA has
identified three major concerns regarding the spread of contracting: the environmental
effects of contract production, the concentration of  control of production associated with
contracting, and the distribution of the benefits of contracting (Economic Research
Service, 1996).  Relatively little is known about the underlying incentives and
fundamental forces that govern the forms and effects of production contracts. An
understanding of these incentives is required in order to determine whether there is an
economic basis for public concerns and perceptions regarding the effects of these
production contracts.  This paper examines integrators’ control of major non-labor
inputs.
Input control is an important feature of broiler and hog production contracts. The
division of major inputs between producers and integrators is consistent across contracts.
The integrator supplies the chicks, pigs or breeding hogs, feed and management
guidelines (Goodhue, 1996; Knoeber, 1989; Martin, 1994).  The producer provides labor
and integrator-specified capital equipment. Based on the consistency of this division, I
address the following question: Why do integrators choose to supply or specify major2
non-labor inputs?  I then address producers’ concerns regarding the structure of these
contract.  Loosely speaking, contracts are a means by which farmers protect themselves
against income risk while sacrificing control and potentially returns.  Many producers are
resistant to the idea of yielding control over the production process and effectively
becoming labor on their own land. Why are producers so concerned about sacrificing
control? Is this due to cultural factors, or is there an underlying economic rationale?
This paper uses an agency theoretic model of production contracts to evaluate the
incentives underlying integrators’ control of key inputs and provide insight into farmers’
concerns regarding their loss of production control. The risk shifting properties of
production contracts have been examined for the broiler industry (Knoeber and Thurman,
1994) and the hog industry (Martin, 1994). Here I abstract from risk considerations to
focus on the issue of production control and the effect on farmer returns.
The standard explanation for vertically coordinated production control focuses on
product quality and innovation (Hennessy 1996, Knoeber 1989). These explanations do
not directly address why producers should be concerned about the transfer of production
control to integrators. Rather, they provide reasons why control is desirable for the
integrator and may increase returns. In contrast, this paper considers input control in the
context of the producer-integrator relationship. It demonstrates that input control
increases the integrator’s returns and lowers the returns to producers as a group when
producers are heterogeneous, even in the absence of any considerations related to quality
or innovation.3
Previous Literature
Previous analytical work on production contracts has focused on the risk-related
properties of these contracts and the compensation measures they use in the context of
homogeneous producers.  Knoeber and Thurman (1995) find that on a per flock basis
broiler production contracts shift most price and production risk from growers to
integrators, compared to spot markets. Martin (1994) performs a similar risk-shifting
analysis for pork production contracts, and finds that producers who choose to contract
reduce their income variability.
Mitra, Netanyahu and Just (1996) develop a bargaining model of horizontal and
vertical integration which they apply to the historical development of the broiler industry
in the Delmarva peninsula.  In their formulation contracting imposed homogeneity on
producer technology and productive capacity.  In another paper,  Netanyahu, Mitra and
Just (1996) attribute the evolution of contract terms over time to a two-sided moral
hazard problem.  This analysis takes the allocation of input control as given.
Knoeber (1989) analyzes the role of relative compensation in broiler contracts in
the industry’s rapid post-war technical progress. Input control allowed the integrator to
impose technical innovations. These papers all discount the role of grower
heterogeneity.
1   Similarly, with the exception of Knoeber, the incentives underlying the
pattern of input control are not examined. This paper focuses on precisely the issues
neglected in this previous work; input control and producer heterogeneity.
                                                       
1 Grower heterogeneity is considered in Knoeber and Thurman (1994) for purposes of testing tournament
theory, but the effects of heterogeneity on the integrator’s decision problem are not explored.4
Producer heterogeneity is an important feature of the agricultural sector. Farmers
differ in terms of their farm size, income sources, and management abilities.
Heterogeneity across producers is an important factor in major agricultural production
decisions (Just & Zilberman 1983, Caswell & Zilberman 1986). For broilers, observers
note that some growers consistently perform better than the average while others
consistently perform worse. This paper incorporates a recognition of heterogeneity in
producer management abilities into the integrator’s contracting decision.
The control of non-labor inputs has been neglected in the general agency theory
literature. In contrast to this paper, which examines the principal’s control of non-labor
inputs as a means of minimizing the information rents paid to agents, the agency theory
literature generally has assumed that there is no substitutability between labor and other
inputs when considering the principal’s incentive problem. Khalil & Lawarree (1995)
examine a related neglected issue, residual claimancy as a source of information rents.
When input and output monitoring are equally costly but feasible the principal will prefer
monitoring labor when she is the residual claimant and monitoring output when the agent
is the residual claimant.  Maskin & Riley (1985) compare input to output monitoring
when the agent is the residual claimant, and find that output monitoring is preferred,
since high-ability agents will exert more effort when their marginal incentives are not
distorted.
Modeling the Role of Input Assignment in Contract Farming
The starting point of mechanism design theory is that an individual known as the
principal would like to base her actions on private information held by other individuals,5
called agents. The agents will not truthfully provide this information unless the principal
gives them incentives to do so; since it is costly to extract this information, an inefficient
allocation often results. Mechanism design is concerned with identifying the optimal
contract that accounts for this tradeoff between informational and allocation costs. Under
the optimal hidden information contract, the principal chooses an allocationally
inefficient contract menu in order to minimize the sum of information and production
costs.  This paper establishes that when the principal assigns or specifies input use, as
agricultural integrators do, she increases her profits by limiting the information rents high
ability agents (producers) can extract in exchange for truthfully announcing their types.
The model consists of a single risk-neutral principal facing n risk-neutral agents.
Agents are one of two types: high ability h with probability p and low ability l with
probability 1 - p. These probabilities are known to everyone..  Output is observable.
Agents’ types and input use are unobservable to others. The only way that the principal
can control input usage is to directly administer inputs. A contract can not be written
contingent on input usage, since inputs are unobservable. Production by an agent of type
i is a function of the agent’s type-specific productivity parameter ti , effort ai and an
input Qi that may be provided by the processor or the producer at a constant unit cost of
c. Output for type i is assumed to be constant returns to scale and is specified as follows:
(1) xQ a t ii i i =
rf
The principal maximizes profits. The agents maximize utility, which is separable
in income and effort. Agents face an increasing marginal disutility of effort. The agents’
utility is defined as follows:6
(2) Utility = income - v(effort)
where the first and second derivatives of v with respect to effort are positive. Attention is
restricted to affine compensation functions, so income is defined as the sum of the piece-
rate payment multiplied by output and a lump-sum transfer.
(3) yw xT ii i i =+
The timing of the model is as follows: the processor offers a menu of contracts, growers
announce their types by choosing a contract, production occurs, output is observed, and
growers are compensated.
Profit Maximization: Input Assignment
The integrator provides two necessary inputs, animals and feed, to producers. The
integrator chooses the amount and quality of the input and when it is supplied. Capital
equipment, although owned by producers, must be built and maintained according to
integrator requirements.  This paper analyzes a single composite input and establishes
that the principal increases profits by specifying input amounts. When agents’ types are
unknown, the principal’s need to provide incentive compatible contracts drives a wedge
between her cost of a specified  pair of output levels for the two agent types and the
agents’ utility-maximizing (and production cost minimizing) production decisions. When
the principal controls the input, she can reduce this wedge. Control over the input reduces
the cost of maintaining incentive compatibility for high productivity agents.
In contrast to the broiler and hog contracts considered here, in some
sharecropping contracts the landlord pays a share of the cost of variable inputs such as
seed and fertilizer, but allows the sharecropper to choose the input levels. These7
arrangements may be chosen because the principal’s knowledge of production is less
accurate than the agent’s, or production knowledge is relatively expensive for the
principal to collect, so that losses due to information rents are relatively small compared
to the cost of reducing them. I do not consider this possibility. The principal has the same
information regarding production and profit-maximizing input use as the agents, but can
not correctly assign agents to one of the two contracts. Contracts must induce agents to
reveal their types.
To provide insight into the nature of the informational advantage of input control,
I begin by analyzing the principal’s choice of contracts in the first best case when types
are known. When types are known, the principal’s ability or inability to control the input
does not affect her choice of contract. When types are unknown, Proposition 1 shows that
the principal increases her profits by assigning the input, which reduces the cost of
maintaining incentive compatibility for the high ability agent.
Known Types.
The case of known types is the theoretical benchmark for evaluating the hidden
information case.  When the principal can restrict heterogeneous agents to their
reservation utility levels, she can increase profits by designing different contracts for the
different types. When there is no hidden information, however, the principal does not
gain from controlling the input in addition to specifying the output level. The principal
and the agent have identical production costs, and there are no information costs so both
will choose the input combination that minimizes production costs, the “neoclassical”
allocation, for any output level.8
Fact: When types are known, the principal’s ability or inability to control the input does
not affect her profits or choice of contracts.
Proof. When the principal knows agents’ types and can restrict agents to their reservation
utility level, the production cost of a given level of output is its total cost. The principal
does not face any incentive compatibility constraints, so the maximization problems may
be solved by substituting the agent’s individual rationality constraint into the principal’s
objective function.
Consider first the case where the principal assigns the input. Using the principal’s first
order conditions and the definition of ai derived from the agent’s cost minimization
























When the agent chooses the input, the principal’s first-order condition and the

























The ratios when the principal chooses the input in (4) and when the agent chooses





corresponds to a unique level of output, and the same output and input levels are selected
regardless of which party controls the input in the first-best case.9
Unknown Types.
In the first-best case, the agent and the principal face the same production costs.
Whoever controls the input will select the neoclassical production cost-minimizing ratio
of effort and the input. In the hidden information case, information costs drive a wedge
between the cost of any level of output for the low ability agent and for the principal.
The agent faces the same costs of production as in the first-best case, but the principal
faces information costs in addition to production costs. When types are unknown, the
principal’s choice of inputs is affected by these incentive considerations. In particular, for
a fixed level of output the principal provides proportionately more of the input relative to
agent effort than she does in the first-best case, in order to reduce the high ability agent’s
information rents, which are a function of the gap between the effort a low ability agent
must exert and the effort a high ability agent must exert to produce the specified level of
output  xl .  Hidden information increases the cost of low agent effort relative to the cost
of the input for every specified pair of output levels for the two types. When the principal
assigns the input, she can respond to this change in her relative input prices by adjusting
the input mix away from effort and toward the input for the low ability contract. When
the agent controls the input, the principal can not adjust her input mix. Consequently,
profits under hidden information are lower when the agent controls the input.
Proposition 1. When types are unknown, the principal increases profits by assigning
input levels according to type rather than allowing agents to choose their own input
levels.
Outline of Proof: First, the agent’s decision problem and the principal’s decision
problem are considered in the first-best case where types are known.  Then the decision10
problems are considered for the case where the agent chooses the input.  Comparing this
system to the first-best system, the low ability agent’s output level is reduced, but the
input ratio is the same as the first best input ratio  for that second-best output level.   The
contract for the high ability agent requires him to produce the first best level of output,
but pays him information rents in order to prevent him from choosing the low-ability
agent’s contract. Finally, the case where the principal chooses the input is evaluated.
Comparing this system to the first-best case,  the low ability agent’s output is reduced,
and the principal chooses relatively more of the input and less low agent effort than she
would in the first-best case for that specified output level.  That is, information costs
distort the principal’s input choices away from the first-best, or neoclassical, ratio.  These
results are used to compare the principal’s profits under the two second-best cases.  The
principal’s profits are higher when she assigns inputs rather than allowing the agents to
choose their input levels.  This completes the outline of the proof. (The complete proof is
available form the author upon request.)
The proposition is illustrated by a numerical example. The following
specifications are used: tl = 1, th =2, price = 1, c = 2,  p = 1 - p = 0:5, va a () =
2, and
fr == 05 . . Effort, input and output levels for both types and the ratio of input use to
effort for the low ability agent are summarized in the table for the first best case and the
second best cases where the principal assigns the input and the agents choose the input.
Note that the ratio of input use to effort is distorted upward when the principal controls
the input relative to the first-best ratio for that level of output. When the agent controls
the input, in contrast, the ratio is not distorted. The principal’s choice of  xl  is distorted11
downward when the agent controls the input relative to when the principal herself
controls the input.
Table 1. Proposition 1 Example
Var. First Best P Controls Q A Controls Q
ah 0.5 0.5 0.5
Qh 0.5 0.5 0.5
xh 11 1
a l 0.125 0.06452 0.00806
Ql 0.03125 0.01613 0.01053
xl 0.0625 0.03226 0.02764
Ql/ al 0.25 0.25 0.14512
Ql/ al (first-best) --- 0.04021 0.14512
This result provides an incentive-based reason why principals, such as
agricultural integrators, may choose to supply their agents with inputs. The principal can
reduce information rents and increase profits by controlling the input. This solution
highlights a different dimension of the relationship between growers and processor than
traditional explanations do, such as differential access to credit, different costs for
obtaining the input and agent liquidity constraints.
Conclusions and Implications12
Using an agency theory framework, this paper establishes that integrators may
drive low-ability growers to their reservation utility level and that they can effectively
reduce the information rents received by high-ability agents through their control of
inputs. This outcome has an important implication for the effects of contract farming and
its role in agricultural industrialization. It will increase the integrator’s profits if she can
reduce agents’ reservation utility levels. Thus if a processor with market power in the
spot market for growers’ output also contracts for production, her decisions in the two
markets will be linked not only by total input needs but also by the effect that expected
spot prices have on growers’ expected profits as independent producers.  Independent
production determines growers’ reservation utility level, so if the processor depresses the
returns to independent production she reduces her cost of contract production. (Her
ability to do so is limited, of course, by the outside opportunities available to growers.)
This effect supports producers’ intuition that contract farming adversely affects
independent producers.
While vertical coordination of agricultural production may indeed aid in
obtaining raw materials with the attributes necessary to meet the needs of ever more
finely defined final markets, it also has real consequences for the pattern of returns across
levels of the production chain. Integrators reduce their payments to producers by
controlling non-labor inputs regardless of any quality considerations. Farmers’ concern
regarding the loss of management control embodied in these production contracts is
based on real economic effects; losing production control is costly for producers.13
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